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Abstract
The breakdown of the interbank money markets in the face of the recent ﬁ-
nancial crisis has forced central banks and governments to take extraordinary
measures to sustain ﬁnancial stability. In this paper we investigate which in-
ﬂuence central bank activity has on interbank markets. In our model, banks
optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves accord-
ing to their risk and liquidity preferences. They are linked via interbank
loans and face a stochastic supply of household deposits. We then introduce
a central bank into the model and show that central bank activity enhances
ﬁnancial stability. We model the default of a large bank and analyse the
resulting contagion eﬀects. This is compared to a common shock that hits
banks who have invested in similiar assets. Our results indicate that common
shocks are not subordinate to contagion eﬀects, but are instead the greater
threat to systemic stability.
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1. Introduction
The onset of the ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted the importance of in-
terbank money markets for ﬁnancial stability. In normal times, banks with
excess liquidity provide interbank loans to banks with a liquidity demand.
This interconnection of the banking system can lead to an enhanced liquidity
allocation and increased risk sharing amongst the banks, as e.g. Allen and
Gale (2000) show. Rochet and Tirole (1996), Furﬁne (2001), or Freixas and
Holthausen (2005) however, argue that interbank markets are characterized
by asymmetric information and are hence incomplete. Furthermore, Freixas
and Jorge (2008), Brunnermeier (2008) and Allen et al. (2009) show that
there are various sources for disturbances on interbank markets. The default
of the american investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and
the subsequent turmoil on the interbank market was such a disturbance. The
insolvency of Lehman Brothers led to an increase of banks’ risk awareness
and risk aversion and ultimately to the breakdown of the interbank money
market.
As a result the risk premia for unsecured interbank loans (as can be seen
e.g. in the spread between the 3 month EUREPO and 3 month EURIBOR)
increased drastically and resulted in a massive impairment of bank’s liquid-
ity provision (see e.g. Heider et al. (2009), Brunnermeier (2008)). Central
banks were forced to undertake unprecedented non-standard measures to re-
duce money market spreads and ensure liquidity provision to the banking
system. Lenza et al. (2010) argue that quantitative and qualitative easing
acted indeed mainly through their eﬀect on money market spreads, eﬀectively
reducing them. This is consistent with Allen et al. (2009) and Freixas et al.
(2010), who show that central bank intervention can increase the eﬃciency
of interbank markets and reduce liquidity risks. From these results it is clear,
that a realistic model of interbank markets has to take the central bank into
account.
Even though the immediate threat of a systemic failure seems to have
ceased, the non-standard measures of many central banks are still in place
and systemic risk remains a pressing issue. There is a vast literature on
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sis. Bandt et al. (2009) distinguish between a broad and a narrow sense of
systemic risk. In their nomenclature contagion eﬀects on interbank markets
pose a systemic risk in the narrow sense, whereas the broad sense of systemic
risk is characterized as a common shock to the ﬁnancial markets, that aﬀects
many institutions or markets. A large part of the literature on systemic risk
focuses on systemic risk through contagion eﬀects. Rochet and Tirole (1996)
for instance state that “Systemic risk refers to the propagation of an agent’s
economic distress to other agents linked to that agent through ﬁnancial trans-
actions.”, emphasizing the role of interbank markets for systemic risk. Iori
et al. (2006) present a network model of interbank markets and analyze the
eﬀects of the bank sectors’ heterogeneity on ﬁnancial stability. Financial net-
works and especially interbank markets exhibit a robust-yet-fragile property,
as for example Haldane (2009) argues. This behaviour of connected net-
works can be best explained as a knife-edge property. Up to a certain point,
ﬁnancial networks and interbank connections serve as a mutual insurance of
the ﬁnancial system and thus contribute to systemic stability. Beyond this
point the same interconnections might serve as a shock-ampliﬁer and thus
increase systemic fragility. This is in line with Fernando (2003), Cifuentes
et al. (2005) and Gai and Kapadia (2008) who argue that increasing connec-
tivity on the interbank market leads to increasing contagion in times of crisis.
The broad sense of systemic risk (as deﬁned by Bandt et al. (2009)) has
become increasingly important in recent years. Adrian and Shin (2008) ad-
dress the issue of ﬁnancial contagion through ﬁre-sales and marked-to-market
accounting and argue that this can amplify the potential impact of a shock
and therefore pose a systemic risk. Acharya (2009) models systemic risk as
the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. Two
types of externatlities are introduced: if a bank fails, there is a reduction of
aggregate deposit supply in the economy, resulting in a reccessionary spillover
(a negative externality). The surviving banks, however, have a strategic ben-
eﬁt from the failure of other banks (positive externality) due to an increase
in scale, resulting from the migration of the failed bank’s depositors. Banks
strategically decide to invest in similiar assets if the negative externality ex-
ceeds the positive externality. In this case there is a correlation between the
bank’s assets which exposes them to common shocks. Acharya (2009) deﬁnes
systemic risk as “the joint failure risk arising from the correlation of returns
on asset side of bank balance sheets”. Acharya argues that bank regulation
3
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systemic risk. The conclusion is that common shocks are not subordinated
to contagion, but are in fact a coequal form of systemic risk. Whelan (2009)
argues in the same direction, giving a simple example where a small initial
trigger leads to a large common shock. Wagner (2009) states that one key
reason behind the severity of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008 was that many
ﬁnancial institutions had invested in the same assets (e.g. subprime mort-
gages), therefore exposing them to a common shock. Irrespective of their
importance, common shocks have not yet received the same attention in the
literature, as contagion has.
A prerequisite for ﬁnancial crisis prevention and management is to assess
both types of systemic risk in an appropriate framework. Brunnermeier et al.
(2009) propose to apply leverage, maturity mismatch or the rate of expan-
sion to measure systemic risk. Lehar (2005) estimates the risk of a common
shock by the correlation between institution’s asset portfolios. Acharya et al.
(2009) recommends to measure an institution’s contribution to aggregate
risk based on it’s marginal value-at-risk and it’s marginal expected short-
fall. Acharya et al. (2010) propose to assess the systemic expected shortfall
which indicates how much an institution is prone to undercapitalize when
the ﬁnancial system is undercapitalized as well. Haldane (2009) suggests to
measure contagion based on the interconnectedness of each institution within
the ﬁnancial system, whereas Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) focus on Co-
VaR, which is the value-at-risk of the whole ﬁnancial sector in times of crisis.
They argue to interpret the diﬀerence between CoVar and the institution’s
speciﬁc value-at-risk as the institution’s contribution to systemic risk. Tara-
shev et al. (2009) propose to apply the Shapley value methodology to asses
this contribution. Thomson (2009) provides a scoring model to categorize
each institution according to it’s contribution to systemic risk. Eligible cri-
teria are size, contagion, correlation, concentration and economic conditions.
A new approach to systemic risk in ﬁnancial markets comes from net-
work theory. As for example Allen and Babus (2008) argue, linkages be-
tween ﬁnancial institutions stem from both the asset side (through holding
similiar portfolios) and the liabilities side (by sharing the same mass of de-
positors). These linkages can be direct (as in the case of interbank loans)
and indirect (as in the case of similiar portfolios). Allen and Babus (2008)
investigate the resilience of ﬁnancial networks to shocks and the formation of
4
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ysis of payment systems (see e.g. Soram¨ aki and Galbiati (2008) or Markose
et al. (2010)). Castr´ en and Kavonius (2009) apply network theory to study
accounting-based balance sheet interlinkages at a sectoral level. Canedo and
Jaramillo (2009) propose a network model to analyse systemic risk in the
banking system that seeks to obtain the probability distribution of losses for
the ﬁnancial system resulting both from the shock/contagion process. Nier
et al. (2007) construct a network model of banking systems and ﬁnd that
(i) the better capitalised banks are, the more resilient is the banking system
against contagious defaults and this eﬀect is non-linear; (ii) the eﬀect of the
degree of connectivity is non-monotonic; (iii) the size of interbank liabilities
tend to increase the risk of knock-on default; and (iv) more concentrated
banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk. In Gai and
Kapadia (2009) the authors investigate systemic crises with a network model
and show that on the one hand the risk of systemic crises is reduced with in-
creasing connectivity on the interbank market. On the other hand, however,
the magnitude of systemic crises increases at the same time.
Even though these new results indicate that common shocks are not sub-
ordinated to contagion, a large fraction of the existing literature focuses
solely on systemic risk through contagion and therefore underestimates sys-
temic risk that stems from common shocks. Network models of interbank
markets may contribute to a deeper understanding of both types of systemic
risk. But these models often suﬀer from their very own problems. Many as-
sumptions about how agents behave are ad-hoc and not well enough rooted
in fundamental principles. Moreover, agents often behave very mechanistic
and therefore limit the ﬂexibility that one wants to obtain by using network
models and multi-agent simulations. To overcome these obstacles, we develop
a model of interbank markets that fulﬁlls three criteria: (i) the behaviour of
agents has to be well rooted in fundamental principles; (ii) both types of
systemic risk can be analyzed; and (iii) the central bank has to be included
in the model since it has a major inﬂuence on interbank markets. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model in detail,
3 presents the results of our numerical simulations, while section 4 concludes
and derives policy implications.
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Iori et al. (2006) develop a network model of the banking system, where
agents (banks) can interact with each other via interbank loans. The balance
sheet of banks consits of risk-free investments and interbank loans as assets
and deposits, equity and interbank borrowings as liabilities. Banks channel
funds from depositors towards productive investment. They receive liquid-
ity shocks via deposit ﬂuctuations and pay dividends if possible. Nier et al.
(2007) describe the banking system as a random graph where the network
structure is determined by the number of nodes (banks) and the probability
that two nodes are connected. The bank’s balance sheet consists of external
assets (investments) and interbank assets on the asset side and net worth,
deposits and interbank loans as liabilities. Net worth is assumed to be a
ﬁxed fraction of a bank’s total assets and deposits are a residual, designed to
complete the bank’s liabilities side. Shocks that hit a bank and lead to it’s
default are distributed equally amongst the interbank market.
Both authors assume a risk-free investment opportunity and Nier et al.
(2007) assume deposits to be a residual. But since ﬂuctuations in investment
returns have to be compensated by banking capital, risky investments are a
major cause of bank insolvencies. Because of the maturity transformation
that banks perform and since deposits usually have a short maturity, deposit
ﬂuctuations are a further cause of bank insolvencies. If suddenly depositors
want to withdraw more deposits from the bank, than the bank has liquid
funds, this bank will become illiquid and goes into insolvency. A model of
systemic risk has therefore to take into account both, risky assets and deposit
ﬂuctuations as possible sources of knock-on eﬀects, contagion and systemic
risk.
We follow Iori et al. (2006) and Nier et al. (2007) in some aspects and
develop a network model of interbank markets. However, we explicitely allow
the possibility of risky investments and deposit ﬂuctuations. We furthermore
include a central bank in our model, since it is evident from the literature
that monetary policy has a large inﬂuence on interbank markets. Our model
allows us to investigate direct contagion eﬀects as well as common shocks.
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We start with the balance sheet of a bank k that holds risky investments
Ik and riskless excess reserves Ek as assets at every point in (simulation-)
time t = 1...τ. The investments of bank k have a random maturity τk
I > 0
and we assume that each bank ﬁnds enough investment opportunities ac-
cording to it’s preferences. The bank reﬁnances this portfolio by deposits Dk
(which are stochastic and have a maturity of zero), from which it has to hold
a certain fraction rDk of required reserves at the central bank, ﬁxed bank-
ing capital BCk, interbank loans Lk and central bank loans LCk. Interbank
loans and central bank loans are assumed to have a maturity of τk
L = τk
LC = 0.
The maturity mismatch between investments and deposits is the standard
maturity transformation of commercial banks. Interbank loans can be posi-
tive (bank has excess liquidity) or negative (bank has demand for liquidity),
depending on the liquidity situation of the bank at time t. The same holds
for central bank loans, where the bank can use either the main reﬁnancing
operations to obtain loans, or the deposit facility to loan liquidity to the














The interest rate for deposits at a bank is rd and the interest rate for central
bank loans is rb. Note that we have not distinguished between an interest
rate for the lending and deposit facility and therefore the interest rate on the
interbank market will be equal to the interest rate for central bank loans.
The banks decide about their portfolio structure and portfolio volume.
We have assumed a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
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where rb denotes the reﬁnancing cost of the portfolio. Since banks obtain
ﬁnancing on the interbank market and at the central bank at the same in-
terest rate, this reﬁnancing cost is equal to the main reﬁnancing rate. It is
possible to introduce a spread between the lending and deposit facility and
therefore allowing the interest rate on the interbank market to stochastically
vary around the main reﬁnancing rate. If a bank now plans it’s optimal port-
folio volume, it calculates with a planned reﬁnancing rate. This reﬁnancing
rate follows from the bank’s plan about how much interbank loans it wants to
obtain on the interbank market at a planned reﬁnancing rate and how much
central bank loans it plans to obtain at the main reﬁnancing rate. If this
plan cannot be realized (e.g. if a bank’s liquidity demand is unsatisﬁed on
the interbank market), banks make a non-optimal portfolio choice. For the
sake of simplicity we want to exclude this possibility. Note that we do not
model an explicit market for central bank money. The central bank rather
accomodates all liquidity demands of commercial banks, as long as they can
provide the neccessary securities. This assumption is not unrealistic in times
of crises, as for example the full allotment policy of the ECB shows.
2.2. Update Algorithm
In our simulation we have implemented an update algorithm that deter-
mines how the system evolves from one state to another. The algorithm is
divided up into three phases that are brieﬂy described here. Every update
step is done for all banks for a given number of sweeps. At the beginning of

















where an underline denotes realized quantities. In period 0 all banks are
endowed with initial values. The update step starts with banks getting the
required reserves rD
k
t−1 and excess reserves E
k
t−1 plus interest payment from
the central bank (we have assumed that for both required and excess re-
serves an interest of rb is paid). The banks obtain a stochastic return for
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k
t−1 which might be either positive or negative. The ﬁrms
furthermore pay back all investments I
k
f that were made in a previous period
and have a maturity of τk
I = 0. The banks then pay interest for all deposits
that were deposited in the previous period. After that the banks can either
receive further deposits from the households, or suﬀer deposit withdrawings
∆Dk
t. At the end of the ﬁrst period, all interbank and central bank loans
plus interests are paid either to, or by bank k.
At the beginning of phase 2, the bank’s liquidity b Qk is therefore given as:
b Q
k
































All banks with b Qk
t < 0 are marked as illiquid and removed from the system.
Banks that pass the liquidity check now have to pay required reserves rD
k
t
to the central bank.
In phase 3 the bank k determines it’s planned level of investment Ik
t =
(λk)∗(V k)∗ and excess reserves Ek
t = (1−(λk)∗)(V k)∗ according to equations
(3) and (4). From this planned level and the current level of investments (all
investments that were done in earlier periods and have a maturity τk
I > 0),
as well as the current liquidity (6) the bank determines it’s liquidity demand
(or supply). If a bank has a liquidity demand, it will go ﬁrst to the interbank
market, where it asks all banks i that are connected to k (denoted as i : k),
if they have a liquidity surplus. In this case the two banks will interchange
liquidity via an interbank loan. We adopt the convention, that a negative
value of L denotes a demand for liquidity and therefore the interbank loan
demand of bank k is given by:
L
k
















t   Lk







t   Lk




Now there are three cases, depending on the bank’s liquidity situation. If a
bank has neither a liquidity demand nor excess liquidity, it will not interact
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The central bank then checks if the bank has the neccessary securities and if













where αk ∈ [0,1] denotes the fraction of investments of bank k that are ac-
cepted as securities by the central bank. If a bank has insuﬃcient securities,
the central bank will not provide the full liquidity demand and the bank has
to reduce the planned investment and excess reserve level. If the bank has
no securities (no investments I
k
t−1), it cannot borrow from the central bank.
This rationing mechanism maps planned investment levels to realized ones.
The second case is that a bank has a large liquidity surplus even if all
planned investments can be realized. In this case, the bank is able to pay
dividends Ak













where βk ∈ [0,1] is the dividend level of bank k. The dividend level will
typically be close to 1 as shareholders will push the bank to rather pay









is transferred to the central bank’s deposit facility. Finally the realized in-
vestments are transferred to the ﬁrm sector and the realized excess reserves
are transferred to the central bank.
These steps are done for all k = 1...N banks in the system for t = 1...τ
time steps. As there are two stochastic elements in the simulation (the re-
turn of investments and the deposit level) we have modeled two channels for
a banks insolvency. The ﬁrst is via large deposit withdrawals. As deposits
are very liquid and investments are illiquid for a (in our model random) in-
vestment time, this maturity transformation might lead to illiquidity and
therefore to insolvency. The second channel for insolvency is via losses on
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 033investments. If the banks banking capital is insuﬃcient to cover losses from
a failing investment, this bank will be insolvent. If a bank fails, all the banks
that have loaned to this bank will suﬀer losses, which they have to compen-
sate by their own banking capital. This is a possible contagion mechanism,
where the insolvency of one bank leads to the insolvency of other banks, that
would have survived if it was not for the ﬁrst bank’s insolvency.
2.3. Model Parameters
There are eightteen model parameters that control our numerical simu-
lation. If not stated otherwise, our numerical simulations were performed
with the parameters given in this section. We performed our simulation with
N = 100 banks and τ = 500 update steps each. We repeated every sim-
ulation numSimulations=100 times to average out stochastic eﬀects. The
interest rate on the interbank market was chosen to be rd = 0.02 and the
main reﬁnancing rate as rb = 0.04. The required reserve rate is r = 0.02.
With connLevel∈ [0,1] we denote the level of interbank connections and
therefore control the basic network structure. At a connLevel=0 there is
no interbank market and at connLevel=1 every bank is connected to every
other bank.
Two sets of parameters are used to describe the inﬂuence of the real
economy on the model. The ﬁrst set is the probability that a credit is re-
turned successful, pf = 0.97. The return for a successful returned credit is
ρ
+
f = 0.09 and in case a credit defaults, the negative return on the investment
is ρ
−
f = −0.05. To plan their optimal portfolio, the banks have an expected
credit success probability pb and expected credit return ρ
+
b . We assumed that
these expected values correspond to the true values from the real economy.
The optimal portfolio structure and volume of a bank depends also on it’s
risk aversion parameter θ. We chose θ ∈ [1.67,2.0] randomly for each bank
to account for heterogeneity in the banking sector.
Deposit ﬂuctuations ∆Dk
t were modelled as:
∆D
k





where γk = 0.02 is a scale factor and x ∈ [0,1] being a random number. From




t ≤ (1 + γk)D
k
t−1. The fraction of a
bank’s investments that the central bank accepts as securities is set to αk =
11


































































































































































Figure 1: The eﬀect of central bank activity. Top left: number of active banks over
simulation time for diﬀerent values of αk. Bottom left: volume of interbank loans L over
simulation time for diﬀerent values of αk. Top right: volume of central bank loans LC
over simulation time for diﬀerent values of αk. Bottom right: volume of investments to
the real economy over simulation time for diﬀerent values of αk. We used ρ
−
f = −0.08 and
the parameters given in section (2.3) otherwise.
0.8, assuming that banks invest only in assets which have a good rating. The
level of dividends βk that a bank pays to its shareholders was chosen as βk =
0.99 which implies that shareholders can ﬁnd more attractive investment
opportunities than the central bank’s deposit facilitiy (which would be the
alternative investment for the bank).
3. Results
Central bank intervention can increase the eﬃciency of interbank mar-
kets, as for example Allen et al. (2009) and Freixas et al. (2010) show. We
therefore investigate the eﬀects of central bank intervention on ﬁnancial sta-
bility. In ﬁgure (1) we have shown the simulation results for the parameters
12
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tivity. We have chosen ρ
−
f = −0.08 since with ρ
−
f = −0.05 very few bank
insolvencies occur and no stabilizing eﬀect can be visible. From the results
in ﬁgure (1) one can see three things. First of all, with increasing central
bank activity the number of bank insolvencies decreases. This emphasizes
the stabilizing eﬀect that the central bank has on the ﬁnancial system and is
in accordance with Allen et al. (2009) and Freixas et al. (2010). Second, there
is only little diﬀerence between αk = 0.1 and αk = 0.8 which means that it
is suﬃcient for the stabilizing eﬀect of central bank activity if the central
bank accepts only a small fraction of bank’s assets as securities. And third,
there is a slight increase in the interbank market liquidity with increasing
central bank activity, leading to the conclusion that the central bank can
indeed enhance the liquidity allocation of interbank money markets. Our
results indicate therefore that central bank activity both enhances ﬁnancial
stability and liquidity provision on the interbank market.
We have also investigated the eﬀect of the interbank network structure
on ﬁnancial stability. We have therefore introduced the interbank connec-
tion level connLevel to vary the degree of connectivity on the interbank
market. The results of this analysis are depicted in ﬁgure (2). Our results
show that ﬁnancial stability increases with increasing connection level and
that this increase is monotonous. Our results indicate that the relation be-
tween interbank liquidity and connection level is non-monotonic. For very
low connection levels there is only very little activity on the interbank mar-
ket. As the connection level increases, the activity on the interbank market
increases up to a certain point. For higher connection levels the activity on
the interbank market decreases again. Since large interbank lending levels
increase the susceptibility to knock-on eﬀects, this is consistent with the re-
sults of Iori et al. (2006) and Nier et al. (2007) who show that the relation
between interbank connectivity and knock-on eﬀects is non-monotonic.
In ﬁgure (3) we have depicted the eﬀects of a varying average risk aversion
parameter. We have kept the lower boundary for θk ﬁxed at 1.67. For this
θ we obtain with our values for ρ
+
b and pb a λk ≃ 0.99, for smaller θ values
we would obtain a λk = 1.0 and banks would hold no excess reserve. Since
this is not very likely, we have chosen this lower bound. The upper bound is
varied and we have simulated for an upper θk = 2.0, θk = 3.0 and θk = 4.0.
With increasing average risk aversion the stability of the ﬁnancial system
13













































































































































































Figure 2: The eﬀect of diﬀerent network structures. Top left: number of active banks
over simulation time for diﬀerent values of connLevel. Bottom left: volume of interbank
loans L over simulation time for diﬀerent values of connLevel. Top right: volume of
central bank loans LC over simulation time for diﬀerent values of connLevel. Bottom
right: volume of investments to the real economy over simulation time for diﬀerent values
of connLevel. We used the parameters given in section (2.3).
increases and fewer banks go into insolvency. As can be seen from ﬁgure (3)
the level of investments into the real economy decreases with increasing risk
aversion which is a direct consequence of the bank’s portfolio choice. If one
is interested in a high investment level, one has to take two countervailing
eﬀects into account. On the one hand, with increasing risk aversion, more
banks are active (fewer go into insolvency) and a larger absolute number of
banks can do investments. On the other hand decreases the fraction of the
risky portfolio with increasing average risk aversion. From ﬁgure (3) it can
be seen that this decrease in the risky portfolio exceeds the stabilizing eﬀect
and that the total investment level decreases with increasing risk aversion.
Iori et al. (2006) argue that an increasing heterogeneity in the ﬁnancial
14


























































































































































Figure 3: The eﬀect of heterogeneity. Top left: number of active banks over simulation
time for diﬀerent values of connLevel. Bottom left: volume of interbank loans L over
simulation time for diﬀerent values of connLevel. Top right: volume of central bank
loans LC over simulation time for diﬀerent values of connLevel. Bottom right: volume of
investments to the real economy over simulation time for diﬀerent values of connLevel.
We have used ρ
−
f = −0.1 and otherwise the parameters given in section (2.3).
system leads to increasing instability. Within our model we ﬁnd no conﬁr-
mation of their result. This is due to the fact that heterogeneity within our
model can arise only through two features. We assume that all banks face the
same investment opportunities with equal risk and return proﬁle. Banks are
insofar similiar as that no bank has better screening mechanism to reduce
the default probability of it’s portfolio. Banks also face the same mass of
depositors, which means that all banks have the same deposit ﬂuctuations γ.
In that case banks can only diﬀer in their risk aversion parameter. The sys-
temic stability then is not driven by the heterogeneity of the banking system,
but rather by the fraction of banks that have a low risk aversion parameter.
We could analyze heterogeneity in the aforementioned sense in the ﬁnancial
system within our model, but this is subject to a subsequent paper.
15

























































































































































Figure 4: The role of expectations. Top left: number of active banks over simulation time
for diﬀerent expectations. Bottom left: volume of interbank loans L over simulation time
for diﬀerent expectations. Top right: volume of central bank loans LC over simulation time
for diﬀerent expectations. Bottom right: volume of investments to the real economy over
simulation time for diﬀerent expectations. The parameterset for “normal expectations”
are the parameters given in section (2.3). For “eager expectations” we used pf = 0.95 and
ρ
+
f = 0.07, for “cautious expectations” we used pf = 0.99 and ρ
+
f = 0.11 and otherwise
the parameters from section (2.3).
As we have seen in the ﬁnancial crisis, it is important for banks to cor-
rectly assess the risk and return proﬁle of their assets. Underestimating the
risk proﬁle of their assets systematically (e.g. by relying on faulty ratings)
might lead to ﬁnancial instability. This is analysed in ﬁgure (4) where we
have shown the eﬀect of diﬀering values for pb, ρ
+
b (the bank’s expected val-
ues for the success probability and return of an investment) and pf, ρ
+
f (the




f as “normal ex-
pectations”. The case pb > pf, ρb
+ > ρ
f
+ is denoted as “eager expectations”,
since banks overestimate the success probability and expected return of an
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 033investment. As “cautious expecations” we have denoted the case pb < pf,
ρb < ρf where banks underestimate the success probability and return of an
investment. It can be seen from ﬁgure (4) that even a very modest systematic
underestimation of the success probability and return of an investment can
lead to a drastic instability. This situation corresponds to a situation where
for example credit ratings are faulty and risk expectations do not correspond
to real risks.
Inﬂuence on
Parameter activeBanks L LC I
β ↑ − − ↑ −
rb ↑ ↓ − ↓ ↓
rd ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
r ↑ − − − −
γ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
Table 1: The inﬂuence of parameter variations on the number of active banks, the inter-
bank loan level L, the central bank loan level LC and the investment level I. ↑means
there is a positive correlation between the parameter and the observable, ↓means there is
a negative correlation and − means there is no signiﬁcant correlation.
There are some more parameters in the model that are of interest. One
can investigate the eﬀect of an increasing dividend level β on ﬁnancial sta-
bility, as well as the eﬀect of an increasing required reserve rate r. It is also
interesting to see what happens at diﬀerent interest rate levels rb and rd, as
well as the eﬀect of increasing deposit ﬂuctuations (which are driven by γ).
Their inﬂuence on the number of active banks, the interbank loan level, the
central bank loan level and the investment level is concentrated in table (1)
where we have shown how an increase in a parameter acts on the system.
One factor that determines a bank’s default probability is the lumpiness
of it’s investments. To clarify this, assume two banks A and B with equal
investment volume and expected return of the investment. Bank A has loaned
a lot of small credits, while B has issued fewer, but larger credits. The success
probability of a larger credit will be larger than the success probability of
a small credit, as banks will audit larger credits with more scrutiny. Since
the expected portfolio return µR of both banks should be equal and smaller
17



























































































































































Figure 5: The eﬀects of credit lumpiness on ﬁnancial stability. Top left: number of active
banks over simulation time for diﬀerent expectations. Bottom left: volume of interbank
loans L over simulation time for diﬀerent expectations. Top right: volume of central
bank loans LC over simulation time for diﬀerent expectations. Bottom right: volume
of investments to the real economy over simulation time for diﬀerent expectations. We
have used the parameters from section (2.3) but with diﬀerent values for p, ρ+ and ρ− as
described in the text below.
credits have a lower success probability, from the equation:
µR = pρ
+ + (1 − p)ρ
− (14)
one can determine the “return” ρ− of a defaulting credit, if the return of
a successfull credit ρ+ remains the same. For ρ+ = 0.09, p = 0.97 and
ρ− = 0.05 one obtains µR = 0.0858 for small credits. We now assume a
slightly larger success probability for credits of p = 0.98. Then one obtains
with ﬁxed µR a negative return ρ− = −0.12. Now it is not 5% of the invested
portfolio volume that defaults if an investment defaults, but 12%. This re-
sembles the greater lumpiness of bank B’s portfolio. For p = 0.99 one obtains
ρ− = −0.33. Those three cases are shown in ﬁgure (5). It is clear from our
18


























































































































































Figure 6: The eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks to ﬁnancial stability. Top left: number of active
banks over simulation time for diﬀerent shock types. Bottom left: volume of interbank
loans L over simulation time for diﬀerent shock types. Top right: volume of central
bank loans LC over simulation time for diﬀerent shock types. Bottom right: volume of
investments to the real economy over simulation time for diﬀerent shock types. We have
used the parameters from section (2.3).
simulations, that a larger credit lumpiness leads to larger systemic instability
and higher interbank loan volume.
We now want to analyse the eﬀects of two types of shocks on systemic sta-
bility. The ﬁrst shock, denoted as shock-type A, is the insolvency of a large
bank. We therefore picked the bank with the largest interbank liabilities in
each simulation at time t = 200 and reduced it’s banking capital by 30%
(caused e.g. by a depreciation on the asset side that has to be compensated
via banking capital). The creditors of this bank now suﬀer losses on their
asset side which leads to a reduction of their banking capital as well. This
in turn might drive further banks into insolvency, even if they would have
survived if it was not for the insolvency of the ﬁrst bank. This is the classical
19
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The second type of shock, denoted as shock-type B, is a common shock
that aﬀects all banks in the system. Here we simulated the case where all
banks have invested in the same class of assets (for example in asset backed
commercial papers) and where this class of assets suﬀers losses, which could
for example be caused by a ﬁre-sale. We have simulated a moderate loss of
10% and 20% on the banking capital of all banks. Note that this corresponds
only to small losses in all bank’s investments, since banks in our model hold
between 8% and 12% banking capital.
Figure (6) compares both shock types and shows that common shocks
are not subordinate to contagion eﬀects, but are indeed the greater threat to
ﬁnancial stability. While direct contagion eﬀects lead to only few insolvencies,
even modest common losses on bank’s investments lead to a large number of
bank insolvencies. Note that the number of contagious defaults is inﬂuenced
by the level of interbank liquidity and that larger liquidity on the interbank
market leads to more contagious defaults. The destabilizing eﬀect of common
shocks however, is in our simulations always larger than the direct contagion
eﬀect.
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this paper we conducted a multi-agent simulation of interbank markets
with household and ﬁrm sector, where the banks are agents and included the
central bank into the model. We analysed which impact central bank activity
has on ﬁnancial stability and were able to show that the central bank has a
stabilizing eﬀect on the ﬁnancial system. Our results therefore lead to the
conclusion that every realistic model of the ﬁnancial system should include
the central bank. It is suﬃcient for the central bank to accept only a small
fraction of the bank’s assets as securities to exercise a stabilising function.
We were further able to show that the liquidity provision on interbank mar-
kets has a slight positive dependency on the central bank activity, leading to
the conclusion that the central bank indeed enhances liquidity allocation on
interbank markets.
We also analysed which eﬀect the interbank network structure has on
ﬁnancial stability and simulated diﬀerent network topologies with varying
20
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creases with with increasing connection level on the interbank market and
that this increase is monotonous. The interbank loan volume however, does
not depend monotonously on the interbank connection level: for very low
connection levels there is only very little interbank lending, which increases
with increasing connection level up to a certain point and then decreases
again for larger connection levels. Since larger interbank lending increases
the susceptibility for knock-on eﬀects, our result indicates that the resilience
to shocks depends non-monotonously on the interbank connection level.
It is an ongoing debate, whether heterogeneity in the banking system in-
creases systemic risk. We have simulated banking systems with varying av-
erage risk aversion parameter and increasing heterogeneity. Our simulations
indicate that the ﬁnancial system is more stable if the average risk aversion
increases. Increasing risk aversion however, decreases the investment level
into the real economy (the ﬁrm sector in our model). There is therefore a
trade-oﬀ between systemic stability and a high investment level. Within our
model, we did not ﬁnd any evidence that ﬁnancial stability decreases with
increasing heterogeneity of the banking sector. There is nonetheless further
work required to analyse which features of heterogeneity drive ﬁnancial in-
stability.
The impact of the quality of credit ratings on ﬁnancial stability is one
further point of discussion. We simulated the situation where credit ratings
are too optimistic by diﬀerentiating between the bank’s expectations about
risk and return and the true risk and return. It turns out that overly cautious
expectations do not have a negative impact on systemic stability. This is in
contrast with expectations that are too eager in the sense that they overesti-
mate the expected return and underestimate the risk of an investment. Our
simulations show that even small deviations from the realized values lead to
large instability. This indicates that better credit ratings can enhance ﬁnan-
cial stability and reduce systemic risk.
We have also analysed the eﬀect of credit lumpiness on systemic stability.
Our simulations give evidence that systemic risk increases drastically with
credit lumpiness. This indicates that ﬁnancial instruments can indeed re-
duce systemic risk and contribute to ﬁnancial stability. The current debate
focusses on increasing regulation for innovative ﬁnancial products and strate-
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risk sharing contribute signiﬁcantly to systemic stability.
We furthermore analysed the impact of diﬀerent shock-types on ﬁnan-
cial stability. We simulated the insolvency of a large bank and compared
the contagion eﬀects that are caused by this insolvency with the eﬀects of a
common shock where all banks lose a fraction of their banking capital. We
ﬁnd that common shocks are by no means subordinate to contagion eﬀects,
but pose instead the greater threat to systemic stability. This is in contrast
with the current debate about systemic risk. In their September 2009 meet-
ing, the G-20 explicitely address systemically important institutions, stating
that “[...] all ﬁrms whose failure could pose a risk to ﬁnancial stability must
be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high
standards” and that “[...] our prudential standards for systemically impor-
tant institutions should be commensurate with the costs of their failure”.2 In
their recent report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors, the Finan-
cial Stability Board (2010) explicitely addresses moral hazard arising from
systemically important ﬁnancial institutions and state three main objectives
of an international policy reform: (i) reducing the probability and impact of
failure; (ii) improving the capacity to resolve ﬁrms in crisis; and (iii) reducing
interconnectedness and contagion risks by strengthening the core ﬁnancial in-
frastructures and markets.
With their proposal, the G20 and the FSB follow a strand of literature on
systemic risk that focusses on systemic risk through contagion eﬀects. New
work on systemic risk through common shocks challenges this classic view.
Our model supports this challenge, even though we have modelled only a
very simpliﬁed version of the ﬁnancial system. Further work is required to
develop more realistic models that capture all key features of the ﬁnancial
system in order to provide policy makers with a guideline on how to assess
systemic risk.
2G-20 Leaders statement, September 2009, downloadble at http://www.
pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.
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